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Introduction
There is, on Youtube, a video entitled 'MRC [Mombasa Republican Council] pastor holds meeting in church'. It shows the speaker -wearing a plain purple shirt and white dog-collar which suggest that he is a minister in a Protestant church -urging his audience not to register as voters for Kenya's general elections, which were to be held in March 2013. 1 The building in which he spoke appeared bare and unfinished, with holes for windows; the white cloth with a cross and a cloth sign bearing the message 'My God is Able' were the only signs that it was a church. The speaker offered no theological explanations for his argument; indeed, his talk did not really touch on religious questions at all. He encouraged the audience, almost all of whom were young men, to become life members of 'MRC' -the Mombasa Republican Council, a group that calls for the secession of Kenya's coastal strip. Furthermore, he suggested that MRC meetings should be held in mosques and churches. This, he argued would allow members to avoid direct harassment from police or officials, and would make them less vulnerable to disruption by crowds of youths hired by local politicians.
The MRC campaign, which was briefly very active in 2011-12 and still simmers in the background, has been seen largely as a Muslim phenomenon, just as 'the coast' generally tends to be seen by other Kenyans as a Muslim area: a recent article erroneously calls the MRC 'the latest Muslim separatist group' in Kenya (Oded 2013 ).
In fact, significant numbers of the people who live on Kenya's coast profess Christianity, practising the same exuberant and occasionally rivalrous forms of Christian worship which are common, if not ubiquitous, across Kenya. Those who speak for the MRC have never explicitly identified it as Muslim, and the speaker in the video above was at pains to stress that this is not a sectarian movement, announcing that 'I have no boundaries, I go to the pastors, I go to the imams' (sina mipaka, naenda kwa mapastor, naenda kwa maimamu). But despite the interfaith, non-denominational logic behind the making and posting of the video it is the case that political activism at the coast, and the articulation of a distinctive sense of coastal disaffection, has been largely associated with Islam in recent decades.
This paper discusses this phenomenon. It is our contention that the litany of coastal complaints -over landlessness, exclusion from political power, lack of access to government services and employment, poor education -has become almost indistinguishable from the grievances expressed by Muslim activists. It is not a coincidence that the loudest voice in the MRC has been that of Mohamed Mraja, a preacher in a Mombasa mosque. This has not always been so. The most famous coastal political leader of the independence period for example, the KADU politician Ronald Ngala, was not a Muslim. Yet since the early 1990s the perceived 'marginalization' of the coast has tended to appear as a particular expression of the wider grievances of Kenyan Muslims. In local terms, it is notable that even in the midst of political activism in the 1990s Kenya's churches did not become significantly involved in political mobilisation at the coast.
The pastor in the Youtube video makes an explicit argument about the ability of the religious buildings to provide physical space for dissent: meetings in mosques and churches are less likely to face violent disruption than those held elsewhere. We argue that in Kenya, both Islam and Christianity have at certain times and in certain places been able to provide an institutional and social, as well as physical space, for political debate. Churches and mosques have protected those who comment from at least some of the dangers of public political speech -though this protection has not been consistent or complete. But more importantly both Christianity and Islam have authorised public commentary, and provided multiple media for the communication of that commentarynot just from the pulpit, but through pastoral letters, local committees, and latterly through DVDs, the internet and mobile phones -in ways that command attention. This history of religious engagement with politics makes even more pressing our core questions: why it is largely Islam, rather than Christianity, that has come to be associated with the expression of coastal dissent, and what does this reveal about the place of Islam and Christianity in politics at the coast -and in Kenya more widely? We argue that the factors that have produced this situation are local, national and international. The political involvement of Muslims and Christians has developed in a contrapuntal fashion, increasingly coming to emphasise the contrasts between the two, and undermining the 'general atmosphere of tolerance and respect' that David Sperling identified as a distinctive feature of religion at the coast (Sperling 2000, 158) . And we argue that this is the contingent result of particular local circumstance, and the very nature of the spaces provided by religion, rather than any innate or inevitable conflict.
Churches, Christianities and politics in Kenya
Kenya is formally a secular state. But its political and administrative elite have been largely Christian; in this, as in much else, independent Kenya closely reflected the political culture of the colonial state. It was from this position of established influence that, in the late 1980s and 1990s, Kenya's churches -or at least, some of themestablished a leading role in the campaign for political reforms which led to the return of multi-party politics (Gifford 1994, 528) . Clergymen from what Gifford calls the 'mainline' churches (also known as 'historic' churches) -Catholic, Anglican, Presbyterian -were persistent critics of the ruling party and the incumbent president; they preached sermons whose Old Testament tales of abuse of power invited comparison with the present, and -less elliptically -they called directly for change (Sabar-Friedman 2002; Hofmeyr 2005, 372-4) ). Galia Sabar-Friedman, whose work has emphasised the importance of the leadership provided by clergy in this period, has described the role of the physical spaces provided by churches in a time of often brutal government repression: these were 'the only available loci for public discussion of civil liberties and the limits of power '(Sabar-Friedman 1997, 31) . More sceptical accounts of the churches' role in this period -which have argued that the churches never espoused anything like a 'liberation theology', and that church hierarchies were considerably less bold than the most outspoken preachers -have nonetheless shared the sense that the physical and institutional presence of churches made space for political dissent in a manner which was profoundly important at the time. As David Throup has pointed out, 'only church leaders had the freedom to criticize government without risking detention' (Throup 1995, 159; also Maupeu 2001) .
Sabar-Friedman also shows that the space provided by churches was not merely physical; as institutions, churches provided a degree of protection to outspoken clergy, and they possessed a range of publications, social networks, and an ability to command media attention through which they could speak to a wide audience. However, as
Gifford has emphasised in a much more critical appraisal of the relationship between churches and political reform in Kenya, other churches were at the same time supporting the incumbent government and its supporters (Gifford 2009, 216-220) .
Moreover, since the era of agitation for multiparty democracy, the number and variety of churches in Kenya has also seemingly grown even more swiftly than has the number of professed Christians (Gifford 2009, 109) . The nature of these churches is particularly salient here. Many are vigorously physical in their forms of worship, and have a strong focus on individual salvation in their theology: while scholarship has struggled to develop a categorization for them, Gifford has suggested that a characteristic of what he calls 'new' churches has been to blur the boundaries between Pentecostal and Evangelical (Gifford 1994, 524-525) .
Attitudes to other religions aside, for the leaders of these churches, campaigns over social justice and governance were a distraction from the much more pressing task of preaching salvation. This difference in theological focus is furthermore emphasised by a contrast in material position. Catholic, Anglican, Presbyterian and Methodist churches have all been sustained by estates of land and buildings which had been built up under the colonial period -while Gifford calls them 'mainline', one might call them 'established', in the very physical sense of having acquired substantial assets as gifts from, or carved out within, the colonial state. The multiple newer churches -there were quite literally thousands of them by the 1990s -lacked these inherited assets. They relied rather on the contributions of their followers, and on the patronage of the post-colonial state and politicians. That some benefitted from the support of evangelical missions, notably from the US, is clear. As Julie Hearn has pointed out, the late twentieth century seems, ironically, to have been 'the greatest missionary era ' (2002, 32) . But to see this external support as the driving force for the success of such churches is to understate significantly the power of their local appeal.
These 'new' churches tended not to involve themselves in challenging the government; indeed, some of them were explicit in their support for the regime, and for the incumbent president, Daniel arap Moi (Deacon and Lynch 2013, 110 (Ngunyi 1995, 126-29) . Whilst Moi finally retired from politics in 2002, the acquiescence by and co-option of these churches continued, along with a creeping similarity in role on the part of the mainline churches. In the elections of 2002 Moi's chosen candidate as successor -and his party -suffered a heavy defeat. In retrospect, this looks more like managed transition than a dramatic victory for a political opposition, since the new government included many politicians who had occupied senior positions at various points during Moi's long incumbency (Anderson 2003) . The reformist activism of the churches had already weakened since 1997, as a result of government manipulation and internal rivalries (Maupeu 2001) . Under the new president, Mwai Kibaki, even the mainline churches seemed increasingly at ease with the government, and more concerned to involve themselves in development projects than in politics. In the election of 2007 many clergy -including some quite senior figures -were drawn into partisan politics in very apparent ways (Gifford 2009, 43-45; 221-23) . The alleged role of some churches in ethnic partisanship and even incitement to violence is indicative of a general move away from civil society activism or movements for social justice outside of the established political order.
The churches' change of attitude to political reform was most vividly displayed in the debates over the new constitution -which had been a key demand of the churches in the early 1990s (Mapeu 2001, 58-59; Sabar-Friedman 1997, 52) . When a draft constitution was put to popular referendum in 2005, the churches opposed it on the grounds that it was too liberal; they argued that it should absolutely preclude abortion and gay marriage. The churches were also opposed to its offer of formal recognition to what are called Kadhi courts, which have long existed in Kenya as courts dealing with matters of domestic law between Muslims, but were not mentioned in the previous constitution (Gifford, 2009: 41) . Some clergymen argued publicly that this was part of a wider Muslim conspiracy to take over not only Kenya, but Africa as a whole (Mwakimako 2007) . On this, almost all churches were agreed -from the major 'established' churches to the new ecstatic churches that had sprung up since the 1990s in urban areas to the multiple, fragmented rural churches born of local rivalries and family schism all across the country. In the referendum the draft was defeated, but this seems to have been the result of popular feeling that it did not offer enough devolution, rather than the consequence of the churches' attitude (Kimenyi 2006) . Tellingly, when another draft was put to referendum in 2010, proposing substantially more devolution of power, the churches opposed it again -but this time it was approved with a significant majority.
Given the previous enthusiasm of the mainline churches for reform, their opposition to the two drafts was a surprising decision. It appears to have been significantly influenced by Kenya's evolving religious and political circumstances. In particular, established churches in Kenya -like those elsewhere in Africa -had been concerned that their adherents were turning to the mushrooming new churches (Asamoah-Gyadu 2002, 23-27) . Christians in Kenya had become very willing to involve themselves with multiple different churches at the same time, and the presence -and the collection-money -of worshippers in the mainline churches could no longer be assumed (Gifford 1994, 521; 524) . Asamoah-Gyadu has also observed, more critically, the power of the 'desire to be successful', and an assumption that material prosperity will be the reward for faith (Asamoah-Gyadu, 2002, 28) . In consequence, devotional practice -including that seen in established churches -increasingly takes a neo-Pentecostal form. While Catholic or
Anglican clergy with a thorough training in scripture might still look down on the preachers of many other churches as lacking in scriptural training, they were uncomfortably aware that congregations did not share their scepticism (Deacon and Lynch 2013, 115) . Thus, while Kenya's multiple Christianities have continued to be marked by a multiplicity of churches there has been a degree of convergence in practice driven by the expectations of churchgoers. This is the religious context in which local and national issues are predominantly played out.
Kenya's politicians have shown themselves as flexible in their religious allegiances as are the populace, attending multiple churches. Bluntly put, while there is no official religion in Kenya, this convergence has produced a set of devotional practices and attitudes towards politics which permeate public culture and have come to be involved in authorizing power. This 'domesticated' form (Gifford 2009, 241) has combined the 'conservative evangelical' tradition of the mainline churches with what
Gifford drily calls the 'very materialist understanding of favour or blessing' associated with the newer churches. This is characterised by conservatism over key social issues, and by a concern with individual salvation, and prosperity. It has also tended to be hostile to Islam, in line with the wider pattern of new churches (Gifford 1994, 530 ).
This approach -and is -also inclined to conservatism in political terms; overtly depoliticized, but in practice closely involved in and reproducing, the political order (Deacon and Lynch 2013, 112) . National and local politicians attend church servicesand act as patrons at church fund-raisers -in a very public way; they are photographed for the media at these events, and often make statements after them. 2 These activities are very often political, in a narrow sense, used by politicians to score points off one another and criticize rivals -but they are not calls for systemic change or dramatic political reform. 3 Kalonzo Musyoka, for example -former vice-president and now senior opposition politician -attended services and fund-raisings, and made political statements, at many different churches in the three years 2011-14: among them Anglican, Baptist, Catholic, Seventh Day Adventist, Africa Inland Church, as well as very 'new' churches like the Jesus Celebration Centre. 4 Appearing at these Christian events is clearly important to politicians, but not because they offer protection for the articulation of radical criticism: instead, they affirm involvement in a shared political culture which revolves around patronage and the overt display of the material trappings of success.
The mainline National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) still issues occasional political statements, although these have tended to take a form so generalized as to be unobjectionable from almost any standpoint (Gifford 2009, 61) . In the 2013 general election clergy still involved themselves in governance programmes and espoused the need for good governance. However, the churches also largely confined their activities to support for an overriding emphasis on 'peace' which came to dominate civil society electoral work (Cheeseman, Lynch and Willis 2014) . When the NCCK did issue a statement which seemed to question the presidential ambitions of Uhuru Kenyatta -on the grounds that he was at the time facing international charges (later dropped) for complicity in the 2008 post-election violence -there was a brief furore, followed by a confused and messy retraction. 5 Otherwise, the mainline churches steered away from explicit political statements other than the generalized call for peace -though candidates for local and national office attended church in more or less ostentatious ways, and offered comments to the press after services. 6 Some of the newer churches took a more active role in the 2013 elections, and in certain cases their involvement took a distinctive form. As with the mainline churches, candidates addressed congregations at services. 7 'Prayer rallies' were also organized for candidates; nominally interfaith, these were in tone and style very much 'new' church events, at which prayers were said for candidates and/or they received blessings; the winning candidates, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, also received public blessings after their victory. 8 The Catholic hierarchy in Kenya declared that 'we will not allow our churches and prayer meetings to be turned into political platforms', but this did not deter other clergy. 9 In some instances this was very evidently done in return for money; but more generally it evoked a set of ideas about the importance of individual salvation and success: those who repent and accept Christ will be blessed, and will prosper -whether this was in terms of material wealth or political office. Again, this was a message which was both overtly depoliticized and profoundly political: success is the reward for accepting Christ, and those who possess power or wealth do so because they are blessed.
Christians and Politics at the Coast
A significant proportion of the population of the coast profess Christianity; indeed, some Christian leaders have claimed privately that Christians are a majority there. 10 Yet the defining characteristic of the churches there is an apparent sense of vulnerability. This is perhaps surprising: Christian evangelism began on the coast earlier than in other parts of Kenya, and by the 1890s there were a number of mission stations in and around
Mombasa. But this early mission experience itself established the sense of vulnerability.
In the early years, the missions existed with the uneasy approval of the Sultan of Zanzibar and came repeatedly into conflict with a local Muslim elite, partly of Arab origin, who objected to their evangelism and to their willingness to harbour runaway slaves (Strayer 1978) . The missions' initial aim had been the conversion of non-Muslim peoples of the coast, notably those now known as the Mijikenda, but their lack of success there led them to build Christian communities by taking in slaves, some freed by British anti-slave trade patrols and some runaways. This was a venture in which they received the (occasionally grudging) support of the British officials who administered the coast from the late 1880s, and whose assistance allowed the missions to build up significant communities on land granted to them. This pattern of sometimes reluctant official support endured throughout the colonial period, during which the number of Mijikenda Christians grew a little, and a modest population of migrant African
Christians from up-country developed at the coast.
Since independence -and especially since the 1970s -the number of Christians on the coast has increased greatly, as it has elsewhere in Kenya. Partly this is because more Mijikenda now profess Christianity; but there has also been a substantial movement to the coast of Christians from elsewhere in Kenya, many of whom are now second or third generation coast dwellers -though some still refer to them as 'upcountry' people (Sperling 1978, 158-159) . This migrant population is largest in and around Mombasa, with other concentrations around Malindi and Mpeketoni. This
Christian growth has had one other distinctive feature: broadly, it is people from elsewhere in Kenya who have been most prominent in the leadership of 'new' churches at the coast. This particular history has shaped Christian political involvement.
In the debates over secession and regionalism around the time of independence in the early 1960s, Christianity played a limited, though not insignificant role. As explained below, secessionism was very much associated with Muslims, but the opposition to it was expressed in racial, not religious terms. The alternative, regionalist movement -which sought substantial devolution of power and had a brief moment of success in the independence majimbo constitution -was strong on Kenya's coast, where it was led largely by men with Christian names, who had been baptized and educated by missions. But it was their education rather than their faith which made them leaders.
These mission-schooled men were a minority in their own communities, and their successful mobilisation of a following played first to the emerging idea of a collective Mijikenda identity and then to a wider idea of 'coastal' identity (Willis and Gona 2013a) . Aware that they were a religious minority, they did not use Christian language or religious issues to make their arguments or mobilise followers; their arguments turned rather on autochthony, and the danger that people from 'up-country' would use their political power in an independent Kenya to appropriate coastal land and monopolize government employment (Willis and Gona 2013b) .
The idea of a distinctly 'coastal' politics, with its own agenda, did not reemerge until the 1990s, when the complex consequences of the return of multi-partyism sparked a resurgence of the debates over devolution which had been quashed when Kenya's first president, Kenyatta, engineered the dismantling of the majimbo constitution in 1964-65.
It is evident that people within President Moi's ruling KANU party encouraged a revival of the debate over devolution in search of immediate political advantage (Mazrui 1997) . But this was an idea which found a ready reception at the coast. In terms of educational attainment and wealth, the coast had fallen well behind some other parts of Kenya; and landlessness had become an ever-more pressing problem. There was a sense among some of those who considered themselves 'indigenous' coast people that the worst fears of the early 1960s had been realized, and many argued that 'up-country'
people -particularly Kikuyu -had exploited political power to enrich themselves at the expense of 'coast' people. The belief that much land at the coast had fallen into the hands of 'up-country' people -whether through well-connected individuals acquiring large plots, or through landless families from the highlands being given preference in settlement schemes -was an increasingly powerful force in coastal politics (Kanyinga 1998 ).
For Christian churches, this sense of coastal grievance was problematic. In so far as the mainline churches had been advocates of political reform in Kenya, this had been within an explicitly national frame. These were, after all, national churches in terms of their structures, and the consultations between the major churches took place in a national forum, the National Council of Churches of Kenya. That some churches were stronger in particular regions was apparent, but all these churches were avowedly What is most notable for our present purpose is that no significant Kenyan Christian voice emerged to champion the coast or argue for devolution (although the redoubtable Father Gabriel Dolan has consistently campaigned over land issues).
Instead, over a period of more than decade in which a series of violent incidents provided sporadic reminders of the intensity of disaffection, Islam provided the physical and institutional spaces for talking about this; and there has been a conflation of the grievances of coastal people and the grievances of Muslims. This has occurred despite the profound divisions amongst Muslims at the coast, which have been repeatedly noted by the literature (Ndzovu 2012) . This process has been encouraged by an international narrative of Muslim marginalization, but it also reflects the very particular Kenyan context of Christian domination nationally. This is why we have deliberately chosen to set out the national, Christian context before considering the role of Islam itself -in order to emphasise that we see the contrast between Islam and Christianity as the product of particular political circumstance, rather than as the inevitable consequence of religious difference.
Islam and the politics of the coast
The state had come to the coast as a Muslim phenomenon: in the independent little citysultanates of the pre-Portuguese period, and again under Omani/Zanzibari rule from the early eighteenth century. Under British rule, the Islamic identity of the state had been both subordinated and maintained -since the coast was, nominally, the territory of the
Sultan of Zanzibar and only under British 'protection', Muslim administrators and a
Muslim judicial system remained in place, though the former were increasingly circumscribed in their role and almost vestigial by the 1960s (Salim 1973) . The politics of secessionism in the early 1960s explicitly turned partly on issues of religion.
Advocates of secession feared that Islamic education and Kadhi courts would be abolished by an independent Kenya (Brennan 2008) . But this religious issue was trumped by race and ethnicity: while the economic and political elite of the coast were Muslim Arabs or Swahili, they were a minority of the population. There were many other Muslims on the coast -but in the political debates of the time they overwhelmingly identified themselves as Africans and/or as Mijikenda, and rejected the idea of secession, which they suspected to be a device to preserve Arab dominance (Willis and Gona 2013b) .
In the following decades, Islam played a role in factional coastal politics -along with race and ethnicity -but it did not become major mobilizing force. While the passage of the Succession Act in the early 1980s was widely resented by Muslims, the constitution was changed to allow multi-partyism, the party was never permitted to register formally. But it retained a sort of existence -as an organization, and as a rallying-point for disaffection -for several years thereafter, despite a prolonged wrangle over leadership between its original founders and a vocal preacher called Khalid Balala, who sought to hitch his own political ambitions to IPK (Oded 1996) . IPK claimed to represent all Muslims in Kenya, but it was very much dominated by coastal Muslims, and the wave of demonstrations, riots and graffiti-spraying associated with it were almost entirely confined to the coast, and especially the southern coast, with Mombasa as the epicentre.
Much of the language of the IPK was explicitly Islamic, and the formal reason for the refusal of registration was that Kenyan law does not permit sectarian parties.
Balala's street-preaching, in particular, placed much emphasis on issues of morality and behaviour within the Muslim community. But this was combined with a wider critique of government policy, and demands for reform; and for a time the IPK cooperated with secular national parties in the campaign for political change (Bakari 2013; Oded 1996 Wandera 2008 Wandera's argument that 'Muslim public identity has emerged in Kenya based on a common experience of marginality' is both perceptive and suggestive -for, as it implies, Muslim politics could lend itself to the expression of multiple kinds of marginality (Wandera 2008 (Wandera -2009 ).
The government response to IPK agitation combined direct repression and the 'vulgarization' of violence to proxy gangs with some limited concessions to Muslims.
Khalid Balala was detained repeatedly, on a series of charges -treason, incitement -and was for a time deprived of citizenship (Oded 1996) . IPK meetings were broken up by with money channelled from government through the coastal politician Emmanuel Karisa Maitha -not himself a Muslim, as he admitted (Ngunyi, 1995; Ndzovu 2009, 6-7) . 15 UMA launched an explicitly racial campaign against IPK which exploited the perennial weak-point of coastal solidarity, the divide between Africans and 'Arabs':
Maitha alleged that 'Arabs were funding the IPK to enslave black Muslims'. 16 The two groups' followers engaged in vicious street battles for a period in 1993-94; and by 1996, the heat had gone out of the IPK campaign.
This did not end Muslim political activism, however; nor did it discourage the identification of Muslim grievances with other forms of perceived marginalisation.
These have been consistent features of coastal politics in particular, and Kenya politics more widely since the 1990s, as Islam's place in Kenyan politics was further affected by the complex consequences of the conflict in Somalia and the spill over from an international campaign of terrorism and the 'War on Terror' launched in response to this (Mwakimako and Willis, 2014 though it developed a much wider coastal and then national presence. CIPK was, as its name suggests, an organization of Muslim preachers, rather than a political party, but its aims echoed the idea that the campaign against the 'marginalization' of Muslims could be pursued alongside that for reform more widely: as its leaders retrospectively explained, CIPK 'started as an idea of various Muslim leaders who realized that there was urgent need to come together and find avenues to provide a voice of relief and reason for marginalized communities and a unified voice for Muslims in particular'.
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The overall effect of this has been that while Christian churches have become increasingly reluctant to criticise the holders of power, Muslim voices, on the other hand -especially at the coast -have been ever more willing to challenge government, whether through radical sermons or through workshops and press releases. The pattern has been self-reinforcing: as oppositionism has come to be associated with Islam, Christian leaders have become increasingly reluctant to criticize government. In 2010, the arrest and expulsion of a visiting radical preacher, Sheikh Abdullah al-Faisal, sparked off violent protests in Mombasa and Nairobi. CIPK leaders worked the story into their narrative of oppression -calling it 'an assault on Muslims'. 20 'We are tired of systematic harassment by this Government', one was quoted as saying; while another reportedly declared that 'it has come to a point where we as Muslims have to start the second liberation. 21 One of these leaders also explicitly compared the preacher's detention to the situation in Guantanamo.
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This radicalism was not, however, completely uniform, nor did it inspire Muslim unity. Persistent rivalries over positions of leadership -driven by personal ambitions and by ethnic, regional and racial divides, as well as by class -encouraged the emergence of multiple organizations claiming to work for the interests of Muslims, nationally and on the coast. Some of these have been studiously loyal to the government of the day, seeing this as a more effective route to influence than strident public activism. Even as the CIPK were rushing to denounce the government over the al-Faisal case, some organizations were much more cautious. In recent years, there have been more Muslims in government, as senior civil servants and as politicians (Bakari 2013) . This is partly a deliberate attempt to reverse the previous severe underrepresentation of Muslims; to some extent it also reflects Kenya's particular politics of regional alliance, in which rival national leaders seek the support of particular local allies. Somalis, in particular, have achieved a new political prominence; this has, if anything, increased rivalries, and the persistently expressed hope that Muslims might actually act as a collective bloc has been confounded by these divides.
The role of religious opposition has also carried its own perils. CIPK and similar organizations have been able to develop reach and influence partly by successful cooperation with international donors anxious to provide funds which might simultaneously promote human rights and good governance and discourage 'radicalization' (Lind and Howell 2008) . Christians demanded that the Kenyan state should protect them from radical Muslims;
Muslims sought to protect themselves from the state.
The 2013 elections and after
In some ways, churches on the coast behaved just as other churches in Kenya did. The mainline churches involved themselves explicitly in campaigns for peaceful participation in the election, and offered guidance which was generalized to the point of cliché, though in some cases it did hint at popular discontent: the Anglican bishop of Mombasa urged voters to choose 'competent' politicians but also 'elect leaders who will deliver them from their misery'. 26 Candidates for office attended church services or inveigled their way into funerals, and sometimes were allowed to address worshippers or mourners. Clergymen in mainline churches were expected to avoid partisan statements from the pulpit, and mostly seem to have done so, but the political views of some were an open secret. Some church workers were recruited as campaign agents by one (or sometimes more than one) candidate; arguably, their role in these cases was not very much different to that of the multitude of other low level intermediaries who turned their modest local social capital to election purposes in return for reward. At the coast, however, the churches were principally concerned to demand that the state protect them, and to situate themselves as good citizens whose concern was to promote peaceful political participation rather than to demand change. 39 In 2014 a murderous attack on the congregation of a 'new' church in the southern Mombasa suburb of Likoni (and bomb attacks in Nairobi not long after) was closely followed by the arrest of hundreds of Muslim 'suspects' in large-scale round-ups in Mombasa and Nairobi. 40 In the wake of the Mombasa church attacks, a senior administrator called publicly for police to shoot to kill when dealing with possible terrorist suspects. 41 Muslim organizations have criticized such threats, and mass detentions. 42 In turn, they have then been denounced for sympathizing with terrorism when they challenge arrests, and have faced increasing harassment from the state. 43 Such bluster suggests how the security forces have struggled both to cope with the challenge of radical violence, and to distinguish between critical Muslim activism and terrorism. Violent radicals play on and encourage that failure, using terror to polarise. After an armed gang massacred nearly 100 civilians in a series of brutal attacks around Mpeketoni in July 2014, they disseminated a video which showed them ostentatiously sparing Muslims, and justifying the murder of non-Muslims by reference to the raids on mosques in Mombasa, and with the claim that Mpeketoni is Muslim land, seized by Christians. 44 The apparent division between Christian and Muslim attitudes to the state has become increasingly stark.
Conclusion
Writing in the UK's Observer newspaper on the 26th of January 2014, former British
Prime Minister Tony Blair argued -echoing Samuel Huntington -that '[t]he battles of this century are less likely to be the product of extreme political ideology -like those of the 20th century -but they could easily be fought around the questions of cultural or religious difference.' In this article, we have suggested that on Kenya's coast, the distinction between an obedient, conservative, nationalist Christianity, and a Muslim community which is routinely associated with opposition to the government, has never been more apparent. But, unlike Blair, we do not see this distinction as fundamentally the product of religious difference. Our argument is that this contrast grows from political circumstances, which have offered Muslims and Christians very different ways of engaging with the state.
Mainline Christian churches in Kenya -fearful of losing followers to 'new' churches, have become increasingly reluctant to criticize the holders of power. They are closely connected with the politically powerful, and espouse theology that is both explicitly apolitical and immensely political in its reflection and reproduction of the inequitable status quo; and on the coast, church leaders express their loyalty to the government by emphasising their vulnerability. Islam, on the other hand, has increasingly come to be associated with a critique of the established order, a position which arises both from particular local circumstance and from a wider, international language of radicalism. This does not mean that all Christians on the coast are enthusiasts for the established order, nor that all Muslims are critics; neither religion constitutes a homogenous political community, and Muslim politics remain fractured, ambiguous, and riven by the discordant factors that challenge collective action throughout Kenya. Yet a pattern of political involvement has clearly been set: the public spaces created by Islam are associated with political opposition, while those associated with Christianity are not.
